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Does democracy promote economic development? This paper reviews recent attempts to 
address this question that exploited within-country variation. It shows that the answer is 
largely positive, but also depends on the details of democratic reforms. First, the sequence of 
economic vs political reforms matters: countries liberalizing their economy before extending 
political rights do better. Second, different forms of democratic government lead to different 
economic policies, and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth 
than parliamentary democracy. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and 
actual political reforms. Taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a 
stronger growth effect of democracy. 
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Does democracy promote economic development? Despite many attempts
to address this question, the answer remains elusive. Richer countries are
generally democratic. But this cross-country correlation could reﬂect reverse
causation or omitted variables. Evidence that political regime changes pro-
duce subsequent economic growth is considerably weaker. Does this mean
that political regimes do not inﬂuence economic development? Not necessar-
ily, but such causal eﬀects are diﬃcult to identify from the within-country
variation.
A plausible reason for this diﬃculty is that “democracy” is too blunt a
concept. Political regimes come in various forms and are reformed in diﬀerent
circumstances. Such heterogeneity is interesting in its own right. Moreover,
if heterogeneity is not random, correlation between speciﬁc reform features
and their occurrence makes it hazardous to estimate an average causal eﬀect
on economic growth.
This paper illustrates three speciﬁc instances where the details of demo-
cratic reform inﬂuence their economic eﬀects. Section I clariﬁes our empirical
strategy. Section II zooms in on political and economic reforms, drawing on
Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini (2005). Democratizations as well as
1liberalizations induce accelerations of growth. But the sequence of reforms is
crucial: countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights
do better. Section III considers diﬀerent forms of democracy, drawing on
Torsten Persson (2005). Speciﬁc democratic institutions inﬂuence the ﬁs-
cal and trade policies implemented after democratization, which may ex-
plain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary
democracy. Section IV distinguishes expected and actual political reforms,
drawing on Persson and Tabellini (2005). Taking expectations of regime
change into account helps identify a stronger growth eﬀect of democracy.1
I. Empirical methodology
While political institutions are generally very persistent, they sometimes
change suddenly and drastically — as in many democratizations or coups.
Under appropriate identifying assumptions, such regime changes can be ex-
ploited by comparing average performance before and after the event, as in
the estimation of a treatment eﬀect.
Our sample has annual observations for about 150 countries and includes
about 120 regime changes over the period 1960-2000; in Section IV, we extend
t h ep a n e lb a c kt ot h em i d1 8 0 0 s ,w i t ht w i c ea sm a n yr e g i m ec h a n g e s . W e
classify a country as democratic if the polity2 variable in the Polity IV data
set is strictly positive.2Per-capita income comes from the Penn World Tables
for 1960-2000 and Angus Maddison (2001) for 1850-2000.
We estimate a panel regression:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = βyi,t−1 + φDi,t + ρxi,t + αi + θt +  i,t ,( 1 )
where yi,t denotes (log) per capita income in country i and year t, Di,t is a
2dummy variable equal to one under democracy, xi,t is a vector of control vari-
ables, while αi and θt are country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, we estimate
the parameter φ by a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology, where countries
changing regime are the “treated”, and those that do not are the “controls”.
Our identifying assumption requires that the selection of countries into
democracy be uncorrelated with the country-speciﬁc and time-varying shock
to growth:  i,t. It allows any correlation between regime selection and the
country ﬁxed eﬀect, αi — e.g., that fast-growing countries more likely become
democratic than slow-growing ones. But it means that, absent any regime
change, average growth in treated countries should (counterfactually) have
been the same as in control countries (conditional on xi,t). This would fail,
e.g., if democratic transitions are enacted by far-sighted leaders, who have a
lasting impact on growth irrespective of the regime change, or if lapses into
dictatorship coincide with lasting deteriorations of economic performance
that are independent of he regime change.
As a concrete example, we might confound economic and political transi-
tion after the fall of the Berlin wall, when many formerly communist regimes
introduced democracy as well as market economy. Therefore, we include in
xi,t a binary indicator for years after 1989 in the formerly socialist countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and the split-up Soviet Union. We also include
indicators for years of wars (current and lagged), since wars are correlated
with regime changes as well as growth. To increase the similarity between
treated and controls, in most speciﬁcations we include dummy variables for
continental location (Africa, Asia and Latin America) and socialist legal ori-
gin interacted with year dummy variables. To reduce serial correlation and
3allow for economic convergence: lagged per-capita income is always included.
Unobserved heterogeneity may also violate our identifying assumption.
Circumstances surrounding regime changes diﬀer widely across time and
space, as do the types of political institutions adopted or abandoned. Thus,
the eﬀects of a crude democracy indicator are likely to diﬀer across obser-
vations. If we neglect this heterogeneity and estimate the average eﬀect of
democracy as in (1),  i,t also includes the term (φi,t−φ)Di,t, where φi,t is the
eﬀect of democracy in country i and year t. Identiﬁcation of φ now requires
heterogeneity in the eﬀect of reforms to be uncorrelated with their occur-
rence. This assumption fails if countries self-select into democracy based on
the growth eﬀect of regime changes (e.g., Di,t =1more likely when φi,t >φ ).
As p e c i ﬁcation including reform heterogeneity may thus render identiﬁcation
of φ more credible by reducing the extent of unobserved heterogeneity.
Such speciﬁcations need to be parsimonious, however, since the number
of reforms is limited relative to the variety in democratic experience. Below,
we decompose the eﬀects of political reforms according to a few observable
features, one at a time. Studying the economic outcomes of speciﬁct y p e s
of reforms is relevant both from a practical point of view, and as a test of
speciﬁc hypothesis. Econometrically, the relative eﬀect of speciﬁcr e f o r m s
can be identiﬁed under weaker assumptions than those needed to identify
their average eﬀect φ.
II. Economic liberalization and democracy
To start oﬀ,w ee s t i m a t et h ea v e r a g ee ﬀect of democracy on growth, i.e., φ
in (1). Column 1 of Table 1 suggests that becoming a democracy accelerates
growth by 0.75 percentage points, an economically relevant and statistically
4signiﬁcant eﬀect (we report robust standard errors, but the results are similar
with standard errors clustered by country). With an estimated convergence
rate of 6 percent per year (parameter β in (1)), the long-run eﬀect on income
per capita is 12.5 percent. Democracy has very similar eﬀects on the invest-
ment rate (results not reported). While both growth and investment tend to
slow down around the democratic transition, controlling for years preceding
a n df o l l o w i n gt h er e g i m ec h a n g ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the inference about the aver-
age eﬀect of democracy (see Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) for more extensive
discussion). Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis (2004) and Richard
Roll and John Talbott (2004) also obtain results that democracy promotes
growth.
Democratization is often associated with economic reforms, such as open-
ing the economy to international trade and extending the role of markets.
Sometimes economic liberalization leads democratization, more often it lags
by a few years — perhaps because similar forces push for both kinds of reforms.
Joint economic and political reforms could violate our identifying assump-
tions, however. Not controlling for economic reforms could bias upwards the
estimated eﬀect of democracy, via positive correlation between Di,t and  i,t
in (1).
Like Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), we use an indicator of economic liber-
alizations originally coded by Jeﬀrey Sachs and Andrew Werner (1995) and
updated by Wacziarg and Karen Welch (2004). The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
estimates in column 2 conﬁrm that economic reforms promote economic per-
formance. Without controlling for the political regimes, liberalizations accel-
erate growth by about 1.3 percentage points (a long-run eﬀect on income of
526 percent).
If the column-1 estimate could be biased, however, then so could the
column-2 estimate. If economic and political reforms are correlated and in-
dependently aﬀect growth, we ought to estimate a multiple treatment equa-
t i o n . I nc o l u m n3 ,w et h u si n c l u d eb o t hi n d i c a t o r s . B o t hr e f o r m sr e t a i na
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on growth, with economic reform having the
stronger eﬀect (though its coeﬃcient falls compared to column 2).
Considering the joint eﬀect of reforms lends additional credibility to the
identifying assumption, but does not fully address the issue of heterogeneity
in terms of the sequence of reforms. Column 4 of Table 1 adds two dummy
variables to the regression: the ﬁrst equals unity if democracy is enacted ﬁrst
of two reforms, the second equals unity for the opposite order, while both
equal zero if only one type of reform is enacted.3Countries where economic
liberalization preceded democracy include South Korea, Taiwan, Chile and
Mexico. The opposite sequence took place in countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, the Philippines and Bangladesh.
Enacting only one reform still has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
growth, similar to those in columns 1-3. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcient
of “democracy after liberalization” is positive and signiﬁcant: the boost to
growth from the two reforms is about 3.5 percent. But “liberalization after
democracy” is negative and signiﬁcant, implying an overall eﬀect which is
barely positive and statistically insigniﬁcant. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)
show that this ﬁnding is very robust. A plausible interpretation is that young
democracies born in closed economic environments are more likely bogged
down in redistributive conﬂict leading to populist economic policies, while
6young democracies in open economies are forced to pay more attention to
economic eﬃciency. Moreover, opening the economy often goes hand in hand
with securing the protection of property rights and enforcing the rule of law,
which may be a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. Naturally, the
usual caveats about identiﬁcation apply. But if the estimates do uncover a
causal eﬀect, they suggest that reformers of closed autocracies ought to give
priority to economic over political liberalization.
III. Forms of democracy
Another source of reform heterogeneity is the kind of democratic institu-
tions adopted or abandoned. Political scientists stress distinctions between
diﬀerent electoral rules and diﬀerent forms of government. In recent re-
search (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, 2004), we show that these constitutional
traits imply systematic diﬀerences in economic policies. A natural question
is whether the growth eﬀects of becoming a democracy diﬀer across these
constitutional forms, and whether policy eﬀects like those uncovered among
existing democracies also appear in the reform switches between democratic
and non-democratic institutions.
Column 1 of Table 2 decomposes the average growth eﬀect of democracy
in two diﬀerent ways. Besides democracy, we include two additional binary
variables classifying democracies by their form of government (presidential vs.
parliamentary) and electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional). Otherwise,
the regression is identical to that in column 1 of Table 1.4
Clearly, diﬀerent constitutions are associated with diﬀerent growth eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient on democracy now picks up the default eﬀect of becoming a
presidential and majoritarian democracy. A new parliamentary democracy
7grows 1.5 percentage points less than a new presidential democracy. By the
point estimates, the growth eﬀect of a reform from autocracy to parliamen-
tary democracy is negative, although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The electoral system, instead, does not appear to inﬂuence the growth eﬀect
of democracy.
A possible explanation for these results is induced policy changes. Based
on cross-sectional estimates within a sample of democracies, Persson and
Tabellini (2003, 2004) found that parliamentary and proportional democ-
racies have larger government spending. Here, we follow Persson (2005)
and estimate the eﬀect on government consumption with the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence speciﬁcation in (1).5 The results are displayed in column 2. A
new majoritarian and presidential democracy cuts government consumption
by almost 2 percent of GDP, while a new parliamentary democracy instead
raises it considerably. The diﬀerence in spending between the two forms
of government is a highly signiﬁcant 5 percent of GDP. This estimate only
exploits time variation in countries that enter and exit democracy, but is re-
markably similar to our earlier estimates exploiting cross-sectional variation
among existing democracies. Proportional rather than majoritarian elections
raise spending by 1 percent of GDP. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant but
smaller than our previous cross-sectional estimates, probably due to the ex-
clusion of transfers (we found the electoral rule to have a particularly strong
eﬀect on social security and welfare spending).
How about other polices? Persson (2005) argues that since parliamen-
tary and proportional democracies seek consensus among broader coalitions
of voters, they should not only have larger government spending, but also
8less protectionist trade polices. In column 3, we thus estimate the eﬀect on
the liberalization indicator used in Section II. Indeed, introducing parliamen-
tary or proportional democracy each raises the probability of a subsequent
liberalization by about 10 percentage points, compared to majoritarian and
presidential democracy.
These policy outcomes may explain the growth eﬀects. A new parlia-
mentary democracy is more prone to pursue economic liberalizations than a
new presidential democracy. But as we saw in Section II, liberalizations fol-
lowing democratizations have weaker eﬀects on growth.6 A tt h es a m et i m e ,
parliamentary democracies raise government consumption much more than
presidential democracies. If this spending binge distorts economic activity,
growth may suﬀer. While the electoral system also shapes policy — with
proportional democracies more prone to spend and liberalize — the spending
eﬀects are less pronounced and may not show up in the growth rate.
IV. Expected and actual democracy
If democracy has a positive eﬀect on growth and long-run income, it is bound
to raise the returns to investment. But investment reacts to expected, not ac-
tual, returns. This means that expected, and not just actual, regime change
aﬀects growth. Suppose upcoming regime changes are (partly) anticipated by
investors. Then, growth will accelerate well before an imminent democrati-
zation, and decelerate well before an imminent coup. This would contradict
our identifying assumption in (1), by creating a negative correlation between
democracy, Di,t, and the growth residual,  i,t, and bias down our estimate of
φ —t h eg r o w t he ﬀect of democracy.
Motivated by this observation, Persson and Tabellini (2005) formulate a
9theoretical model of economic and political change, where both actual and
expected political regime inﬂuence economic growth. In the model, countries
stochastically enter and exit from democracy with probabilities inﬂuenced by
current and lagged income. The probability of regime change also depends
on a country’s “democratic capital”, which inﬂuences the willingness of its
citizens to stand up for democracy. Democratic capital is assumed to accu-
mulate in years of democracy and in countries with democratic neighbors,
but to depreciate under autocracy. Identiﬁcation is achieved by an exclu-
sion restriction derived in the model, namely that democratic capital has no
direct eﬀect on growth (given all the other controls).
Persson and Tabellini (2005) discuss the empirical strategy in detail.
Here, we estimate an equation similar to (1) augmented by the probabil-
ity of regime change — in the form of a hazard rate — as estimated by Persson
and Tabellini (2005) over the full sample 1850-2000.7T h eg r o w t he q u a t i o ni s
consistent with the estimated hazard rate: see Table 3 for details. As coun-
try and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included, we estimate the eﬀects of expected
democracy entirely from the time variation in the hazard rate.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 report the estimated results within
regimes, conﬁning attention to observations under democracy only, or autoc-
racy only. In each sample, we not only consider economic growth (available
for 1850-2000), in Panel A, but also investment (available for 1960-2000),
in Panel B. Under democracy, the probability of regime change hurts both
investment and growth, as expected and consistent with the ﬁnding that
democracy raises growth. The large negative estimated coeﬃcient reﬂects
the dimension of the estimated hazard rate, which is typically below 10 per-
10cent, with an average of 3. A fall in the hazard by 2 percentage points thus
raises growth by about 0.5 percentage points.8Under autocracy, the proba-
bility of regime change ought to spur growth and investment. Instead, both
coeﬃcients are negative although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. One
interpretation is that we have omitted a further heterogeneity, such that de-
mocratic reforms fail to boost economic performance in some autocracies.
Alternatively, political uncertainty exerts an oﬀsetting negative eﬀect.
In column 3, we study actual as well as expected political regimes in
the full sample, including the democracy dummy plus the probability of
autocracy in the current period (alone and interacted with lagged democracy
to allow the eﬀect of expectations to diﬀer by regime).9In addition to the
exclusion restriction for democratic capital, we rely on the usual identifying
assumption —  i,t in (1) uncorrelated with Di,t — now made more credible
by including the probability of autocracy as a regressor. This speciﬁcation
is demanding, because actual democracy and the probability of autocracy
are highly collinear due to the inertia of political regimes. Nevertheless,
the results support the idea that democracy has a positive eﬀect on growth
and that expectations also play a role. Actual democracy now induces a
growth acceleration of over 1 percent. Given an estimated convergence rate
of 2.8 percent, the implied long-run rise in per-capita income is 35 percent
The estimated growth eﬀect is larger than in Table 1, where expectations
are neglected. More importantly, it is also much larger than in the same
speciﬁcation over 150 years of data, without controlling for the probability
of autocracy (see Persson and Tabellini, 2005). Thus, including expected
regime changes brings out a more forceful eﬀect of actual transitions on
11growth, in line with the idea that omitting expectations would violate the
identifying assumptions. The estimated coeﬃcients on investment are more
disappointing. Overall, the results in this section imply that stable and
persistent democracy has a stronger eﬀect on development than democracy
per se.
Taken together, the results in our paper suggest that democracy is in-
deed too blunt a concept: the devil is in the details. Future theoretical and
empirical work should pay close attention to the heterogeneity of political
reforms.
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1 The three papers cited in this paragraph provide references on democracy
and growth. Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg (2005) obtain related results
with diﬀerent disaggregations of the eﬀect of democracy.
2 Large changes in polity2 are generally clustered around 0. Although lower
than that often chosen by political scientists, this threshold more easily cap-
tures the eﬀect of discrete political reforms. We discard reforms in the last
three years of the sample, setting to missing the observations of outcomes
after such reforms. At the start of the sample, we only require one available
observation before the reform. See Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson
(2005) for more details.
3 To unambiguously identify the sequence, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) only
15classify episodes that last at least four years as reforms, omitting temporary
changes in political or economic institutions. The variables in column 4 of
Table 1 use this classiﬁcation, which diﬀers slightly from that in the preceding
columns for a few countries.
4 T a b l e2a s s u m e st h ee ﬀect of the form of government and the electoral
system to be additive. The results are robust to relaxing this assumption.
5 While Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) use IMF data for central gov-
ernment spending (including transfers), here we use Penn World Tables for
central plus local government consumption, in percent of GDP.
6 Indeed, all countries that ﬁrst opened the economy, and then democratized,
became presidential democracies, while the opposite sequence is observed for
both forms of government.
7 The speciﬁcation of the hazard rate includes democratic capital, lagged
per capita income, a dummy variable for war years (current and lagged),
dummy variables for democracy at independence, colonial origin, geographic
location, socialist legal origin, and a linear and quadratic time trend.
8 Transition years (deﬁned as the year of the change in regime and the im-
mediately preceding year) are omitted from the sample, to ensure that the
results are not just due to unrest during democratic transitions. Results
are very similar for growth on the shorter sample 1960-00 (still using the
Maddision data for per capita income).
9 Earlier empirical work by Adam Przeworski et al (2000) considers the eﬀect
of expected regime changes on economic growth in the post war period.
16Table 1     Effects of political and economic 
reforms on economic growth (1960-2000)   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Democracy    0.75**   
(0.34) 




Liberalization         1.31*** 
(0.39) 
  0.92** 
(0.39) 








    
  -1.71***   
(0.62) 
        
N. of countries  138  134  130  130 
N. of observations  4338  4492  4229  4229 
Adj. R-square  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.12 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%   
Control variables: country and year fixed effects, lagged income, dummy variable 
for wars and lagged wars, dummy variable for former socialist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe plus former Soviet Union after 1990, year dummy 
variables interacted with dummy variables for Latin America, Africa, Asia and 
Socialist legal origin 
 Table 2    Forms of democracy, growth and 
economic policies (1960-2000)   
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Growth  Government 
consumption 
Liberalization 
Democracy    1.00**   
(0.51) 
−   1.87***     
(0.54) 




− 1.61***  
(0.59) 
    4.89*** 
(0.79) 




0.16      
(0.49) 
   1.15**       
(0.49) 
    0.11***      
(0.03) 
      
N. of countries  138  150  132 
N. of observations  4338  4552  4578 
Adj. R-square  0.14  0.20  0.47 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Control variables: country and year fixed effects, dummy variable for wars and 
lagged wars, dummy variable for former socialist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe plus former Soviet Union after 1990, year dummy variables 
interacted with dummy variables for Latin America, Africa, Asia and Socialist 
legal origin 
               Table 3    Expected and actual democracy,  
                              growth, and investment  
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Democracies  Autocracies  Full  sample 
 
Panel A  Dependent variable:  Growth 1850-2000 
 
Hazard rate out of 
current regime  
−  20.05***   
(5.51) 
− 17.85 
    (11.93) 
 
Democracy       





0.47         
(0.73) 
Prob. of autocracy in 
lagged democracy  
   
− 3.42       
(2.52) 
       
N. of countries  107  117  148 
N. of observations  3656  4130  8135 
Adj. R-square   0.19  0.12  0.10 
      
 
 







 Panel B   Dependent Variable:  Investment 1960-2000 
 
Hazard rate out of 
current regime  
− 27.03**     
(12.10) 
    − 19.43     
      (21.73) 
 
Democracy       





0.00         
(0.75) 
Prob. of autocracy in 
lagged democracy  
   
− 2.30        
(4.15) 
       
N. of countries  94  84  131 
N. of observations  1840  1897  4080 
Adj. R-square   0.14  0.12  0.11 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in first parentheses:  significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Control variables: country and year fixed effects, lagged income, dummy variable 
for wars and lagged wars, dummy variable for former socialist countries in Central  
and Eastern Europe plus former Soviet Union after 1990 
Transition years excluded from columns 1-4; an indicator for transition years is  
included in columns 5-6. 
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